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Janack: Constitutional Law - Freedom of Speech: Public Employee - Can We

CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW-Freedom
of
Speech:
Public
Employee-Can We Talk? The Wyoming Supreme Court
Grants Little Protection
to
Public-Employee
Whistleblowers. Mekss v. Wyoming Girls' School, 813 P.2d
185 (Wyo. 1991).
Ms. Regina Mekss (Mekss) was employed for three years as a
bookkeeper at the Wyoming Girls' School (School).' She was a wellliked employee and received good to excellent job evaluations.2 Because Mekss felt that certain conditions at the School were detrimental to the residents and the staff, she wrote an anonymous letter to
the Board of Charities and Reform (Board) in August 1988. 3 The letter described disharmony at the School and poor employee morale
due to harmful management policies and the failure of reporting procedures.4 Mekss reported favoritism, harassment of employees who
complained, improper hiring practices, and use of outdated teaching
and therapy techniques.' She questioned the lack of female guards
and alleged improper use of corporal punishment on the residents.6
Subsequently,
the Board elected to conduct an investigation at the
7
School.

1. Mekss v. Wyoming Girls' Sch., 813 P.2d 185, 187-88 (Wyo. 1991), cert. denied,
112 S. Ct. 872 (1992). The Wyoming Girls' School was created to educate and rehabilitate adolescent girls committed by the state's district courts. Id. at 187 (citing Wvo.
STAT. §§ 25-4-101 to -103 (1977)). The Board of Charities and Reform has general
supervisory control over the School and consists of the governor, the secretary of state,
the state treasurer, the state auditor and the state superintendent of public instruction. Id. (citing Wyo. CONST. art. VII, § 18; Wyo. STAT. § 25-1-101 (1977)). The Board
appoints an executive secretary to evaluate and report the conditions at the School. Id.
(citing Wyo. STAT. § 25-1-103(a) and (b)(ii) (1977)). The Board also appoints a school
superintendent to oversee the School's daily operations. Id. (citing Wyo. STAT. § 25-1201(b)(i) and (c) (1977)).
2. Mekss, 813 P.2d at 187-88, 192.
3. Id. at 188.
4. Id. Earlier in 1988, Mr. Jack Geisler, Superintendent of the School, wrote a
memorandum requesting that staff bring concerns to either him or the assistant superintendent. Id. However, Mekss thought Geisler was unapproachable and questioned
whether she would be treated fairly when reporting problems. In a later speech to the
staff, he warned that anonymous criticism of School policies would be dealt with severely. Brief of Appellant at 9, app. at [6], Mekss v. Wyoming Girls' Sch., 813 P.2d 185
(Wyo. 1991) (No. 89-235), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 872 (1992).
5. Mekss, 813 P.2d at 188-89; Brief of Appellant, supra note 4, at 7, app. at [7].
Problems had been escalating for over a year, and several employees had written anonymous letters to the Board during 1988. These letters contained allegations similar to
Mekss'. Mekss, 813 P.2d at 188.
6. Brief of Appellant, supra note 4, at 7, app. at [7].
7. Mekss, 813 P.2d at 189. State corrections personnel conducted the investigation. Investigators asked each employee a list of questions in a fifteen-minute interview. Based upon this investigation, Mr. Gary Sherman, Executive Secretary of the
Board, wrote to Geisler, "You have the overwhelming support of your staff... No one
demonstrated any proof of the anonymous allegations ....
There were six employees
who expressed universal dissatisfaction." Id. He concluded that "the allegations were
spurious, mean spirited and without substance." Id. Following the investigation, Geisler changed a few staff schedules in an attempt to improve morale. Id.
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After the investigation, problems and distrust continued.8 Secretary of State Kathy Karpan (Karpan) advised employees who were
disappointed with the investigation to take specific concerns directly
to Gary Sherman (Sherman), Executive Secretary of the Board.9
Mekss took Karpan's advice and attempted to call Sherman. However,
when Mr. Jack Geisler (Geisler), Superintendent of the School,
learned of the attempted call, he arranged to meet with Mekss. Those
attending the meeting were Geisler; Mekss; Gary Kopsa, the Assistant
Superintendent; and Carol Maxwell, Mekss' immediate supervisor. 0
At the close of the meeting, all four signed a memorandum which
stated that Mekss should subsequently bring School problems only to
one of these three superiors."
Thereafter, Mekss succeeded in speaking with Sherman. During
their conversation, Mekss told Sherman that she had written one of
the anonymous letters. Despite his earlier assurances that he welcomed information about the investigation,12 Sherman told Mekss
that she was at risk for violating the School's chain-of-command by
bringing her complaints to him and that he would inform Geisler of
this."3
When informed, Geisler arranged to confront Mekss to discipline
her for insubordination. He gave her three options: (1) resign; (2) accept a two-week suspension and write a letter of apology; or (3) be
terminated." Mekss chose the second option and was suspended for
two weeks. During this time she wrote and submitted a letter of apology to Geisler."' Because the letter did not retract her allegations, Geisler refused to accept it, and Mekss was terminated." Geisler indicated that Mekss was terminated for (1) circumventing established
lines of authority
and (2) refusing to accept disciplinary measures
7
imposed.'

8. Brief of Appellant, supra note 4, at 8-9.
9. Mekss, 813 P.2d at 189. In November 1988, under a statutory duty, the Board
visited the School. Id. (citing Wyo. STAT. § 25-1-104(b) (1977)). At this time, Karpan
met with Mekss and other dissatisfied employees. Id. A few weeks later, Karpan, Sherman, and Mekss' co-worker talked by conference call about the investigation. Sherman
told the co-worker that he welcomed information about the investigation and that
there would be no retaliation against any employee who talked to him. Brief of Appellant, supra note 4, at 10.
10. Mekss, 813 P.2d at 189-90; Brief of Appellee at 10, Mekss v. Wyoming Girls'
Sch., 813 P.2d 185 (Wyo. 1991) (No. 89-235), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 872 (1992). At
this meeting, Mekss told those present that the call to Sherman concerned the investigation generally and did not specifically address School matters. Brief of Appellant,
supra note 4, at 10-11.
11. Mekss, 813 P.2d at 190.
12. See supra note 9.
13. Mekss, 813 P.2d at 190. The School's chain-of-command procedure was established by two memoranda. See supra note 4 and text accompanying note 11.
14. Mehss, 813 P.2d at 190.
15. Id.
16. Id. at 190-91.
17. Id. at 191.

https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/land_water/vol27/iss2/15

2

Janack: Constitutional Law - Freedom of Speech: Public Employee - Can We
1992

CASENOTES

Pursuant to Wyoming administrative procedures, Mekss challenged the termination through an appeal to a personnel review
board." The board upheld Mekss' termination because she had violated the chain-of-command and had created disharmony at the
School. 9 On appeal, the state district court affirmed the personnel review board's decision."0 In a subsequent appeal to the Wyoming Supreme Court, Mekss claimed that her First Amendment right to freedom of speech as a whistleblower had been violated.21 Because of the
First Amendment claim, the court independently examined the entire
record to determine whether the speech should be constitutionally
protected."
In its analysis, the Wyoming Supreme Court used a sequential
test developed from United States Supreme Court cases concerning
this public-employee, freedom of speech issue.' 3 The main theme of
the sequential test is in recognizing that a court must balance the employee's interest with that of the employer. A public employee has an
interest, like that of any citizen, in being able to criticize public institutions. This interest competes with the employer's interest in facili-

18. Id. (citing the Wyoming Administrative Procedure Act, Wvo. STAT. §§ 16-3101 to -115 (1977)).
19. Id. at 192. Subsequently, the Wyoming Supreme Court found Mekss had not,
in fact, created disharmony at the School. The court, therefore, modified the personnel
review board's finding of fact to read, "Ms. Mekss was insubordinate in circumventing
established lines of authority." Id. at 203.
20. Id. at 192.
21. Id. at 192, 194. A whistleblower is an employee who reports unlawful or
wrongful activities to a superior inside the whistleblower's organization or to someone
outside the organization. Sheldon E. Friedman, Whistleblowing: A Growing Trend, 19
COLO. LAW. 1313; BLACK'S LAW DiCTIoNARY 1596 (6th ed. 1990). As of 1990, Friedman
states that, "[tlhirty states have enacted legislation to protect whistleblowers." Friedman at 1313 (discussing Colorado's whistleblower statute). See, e.g., CAL. LAB. CODE §
1102.5 (West 1989); CAL. Gov. CODE §§ 10540 to -46 (West 1980 & Supp. 1992); COLO.
REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 24-50.5-101 to -107 (West 1990); HAW. REV. STAT. §§ 378-61 to -69
(1988); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 75-2973 (1989 & Supp. 1991). Wyoming has not enacted
whistleblower legislation. Some states protect private employee whistleblowers. See,
e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 24-114-101 to -103 (West 1990 & Supp. 1991); CONN. GEN.
STAT. ANN. § 31-51m (West 1987 & Supp. 1991). Congress also promotes whistleblowing and has enacted legislation to protect federal employees. See, e.g., Whistleblower
Protection Act of 1989, §4, 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8) (Supp. II 1990). For a general discussion of state statutory action, see Carrie Donald and John Remington, Recent Developments and Trends in Public Sector Employee Relations, 5 ANN. LAB. & EMP. L.
INST. 149, 152-53 (1990). See generally Robert D. Boyle, A Review of Whistle Blower
Protections and Suggestions for Change, 41 LAB. L.J. 821 (1990); John L. Howard,
Current Developments in Whistleblower Protection, 39 LAB. L.J. 67 (1988) (discussing
whistleblower protections and difficulties in proving employer retaliation).
22. Mekss, 813 P.2d at 193. The Wyoming Supreme Court followed the directive
of the United States Supreme Court in its review. Id. at 194 (citing New York Times
Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 284-86 (1964)).
23. Id. at 194. See Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 563 (1968); Mount
Healthy City Sch. Dist. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274 (1977); Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138
(1983). Although the Wyoming Supreme Court could have used the Wyoming Constitution to provide greater freedom of speech, it chose to analyze the facts in Mekss
under the First Amendment of the United States Constitution, which sets the minimum level of protection. Mekss, 813 P.2d at 192-93 (citing WYo. CONST., art 1, § 20).
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tating its service to the public through an efficient and harmonious
work environment necessitating a balancing process.2 4
In Mekss, the Wyoming Supreme Court balanced the competing
interests and found that Mekss' anonymous letter was entitled to
First Amendment protection., However, notwithstanding this heightened level of protection, the court determined that Mekss' insubordination was a legitimate reason for the termination, separate from the
protected speech. 6
This casenote presents a chronological overview of the applicable
United States Supreme Court cases to demonstrate the evolution of
the sequential, four-part test used in public-employee, freedom of
speech cases. It then outlines the Wyoming Supreme Court majority's
and dissent's analysis of the anonymous letter and telephone call using this test. The casenote criticizes the majority's analysis because
the majority did not grant Mekss whistleblower status. As a result, the
majority's analysis was skewed. The casenote demonstrates that because Mekss was a whistleblower, her speech should have been entitled to the highest constitutional protection. However, the court ultimately granted the speech little protection which resulted in an
erroneous decision. The casenote concludes that the court's decision
will deter Wyoming public-employee whistleblowers to the detriment
of the people of the Wyoming. :
BACKGROUND

For the last forty years, the United States Supreme Court has
protected a public employee's right to freedom of speech.28 In Keyi24. See Pickering, 391 U.S. at 568. For a discussion of employee and employer
interests relating to the organizational model being considered, see Toni M. Massaro,
Significant Silences: Freedom of Speech in the Public Sector Workplace, 61 S. CAL.
L. REV. 3, 51-63 (1987). According to Massaro, the employee and employer's interests
diverge only within certain organizational models. For example, under a bureaucratic,
or rational systems model, the main focus within the organization is on the institutional goals to be achieved rather than on the individuals or relationships which affect
efficiency. Because bureaucratic organizations are hierarchical, they grant broad managerial authority and limit employee freedom. Most courts use this model even though
it is a poor model on which to base First Amendment protection.
Conversely, under a natural systems model, according to Massaro, the interests of
the employee and the employer do not differ and therefore, do not compete. This organizational model focuses on individuals and relationships within the organization and
does not equate employee efficiency with employee silence. Workers are not managed
like robots and forced to adapt to a rigid, hierarchical system. Id.
25. Mekss, 813 P.2d at 195, 203.
26. Id. at 203.
27. Other jurisdictions grant significant protection to whistleblowers. See Pickering, 391 U.S. at 572; Considine v. Board of County Comm'rs, 910 F.2d 695 (10th Cir.
1990); Schalk v. Gallemore, 906 F.2d 491 (10th Cir. 1990); Knapp v. Whitaker, 757
F.2d 827 (7th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 803 (1985); Anderson v. Central Point
Sch. Dist. No. 6, 746 F.2d 505 (9th Cir. 1984); Brockell v. Norton, 732 F.2d 664 (8th
Cir. 1984).
28. Prior decisions held that since government employment was a privilege, an
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shian v. Board of Regents, decided in 1967, the United States Supreme Court held that the government cannot unreasonably condition
public employment upon the surrender of First Amendment rights. 29
One year later, in Pickering v. Board of Education, the Court narrowed Keyishian and held that public employers may regulate employee speech under certain circumstances."
Balancing the Competing Interests of Employee and Employer
In Pickering, the school board terminated a public school teacher
because he wrote a letter, critical of the school board's allocation of
school funds and the school board's explanation of a bond issue proposal, which was published in a local newspaper."1 The United States
Supreme Court determined that a balance was necessary "between the
interests of the [employee], as a citizen, in commenting upon matters
of public concern and the interest of the State, as an employer, in
promoting the efficiency of the public services it performs
"3....
2 This
weighing process became known as the Pickering balancing test. 33 In
Pickering, the Court discussed circumstances relevant, though not exclusive, to the balancing process.34 Factors to be evaluated included:
(1) whether the employee's speech impaired discipline by superiors or
harmony among co-workers; (2) whether the speech had a harmful impact on working relationships requiring loyalty and confidence; (3)
whether the employee's position required confidentiality; and (4)
whether the speech hindered the employee's job performance or interfered with the regular operation of the organization. 5 Additionally,
although the teacher was not labeled a whistleblower, the speech in
Pickering arose in that context.3 6 As a result, the United States Su-

employee had no constitutional right to it and could be fired at will. Adler v. Board of
Educ., 342 U.S. 485 (1952); McAuliffe v. Mayor of New Bedford, 29 N.E. 517 (Mass.
1892).
29. Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589 (1967). Keyishian struck down a
New York law which permitted governing boards to dismiss teachers for knowingly
belonging to a subversive organization. Id.
30. Pickering, 391 U.S. at 568. The circumstances in which an employer may regulate employee speech were considered by the Court when it balanced the interests. See
infra text accompanying notes 34 and 35.
31. Pickering, 391 U.S. at 566.
32. Id. at 568.
33. See Schalk v. Gallemore, 906 F.2d 491, 496-97 (10th Cir. 1990); Jurgensen v.
Fairfax County, 745 F.2d 868, 880, 888-89 (4th Cir. 1984).
34. Pickering, 391 U.S. at 569-73.
35. Donahue v. Staunton, 471 F.2d 475, 481 (7th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 410 U.S.
955 (1973) (referring to Pickering, 391 U.S. at 569-73).
36. Pickering, 391 U.S. at 572. In Pickering, the Court encouraged public school
teachers to comment on school board activities even when the impact would be felt
outside the teacher's subject area.
Teachers are, as a class, the members of a community most likely to have informed and definite opinions as to how funds allotted to the operation of the
schools should be spent. Accordingly, it is essential that they be able to speak
freely on such questions without fear of retaliatory dismissal.
Id. See supra note 21 for a discussion of whistleblowing.
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preme Court considered whether the teacher had knowingly or recklessly made false statements. 7 Following the Pickering decision,
courts used these factors, as applicable, when balancing the competing
interests in public-employment, First Amendment cases."8
Adding Causation: "Substantial Factor" and "Shifting the Burden"
In 1977, the United States Supreme Court addressed the issue of
causation in Mount Healthy City Board of Education v. Doyle.3 9 In
Mount Healthy City, a non-tenured teacher's contract was not renewed after he gave information from a school memorandum to a local radio station. This information, announcing the adoption of a
dress code for teachers, was broadcast as a news item."' After balancing the competing interests, the Court found that the teacher's speech
was protected under the First Amendment.4 1 However, because the
school board may have had more than one motive for not renewing
the contract,42 the teacher was required to prove that the memorandum was a substantial factor in the decision. Once the employee met
his burden, the burden shifted to the employer to prove that there
was a separate, permissible reason which was unrelated to the protected speech.44 The Court determined that it should not reinstate an
employee if there was a legitimate reason for the school board's decision.4 5 Otherwise, an employee who spoke out could be protected regardless of his other conduct.4"

37. Pickering, 391 U.S. at 569. The knowingly or recklessly false standard was
used by the United States Supreme Court in determining whether defamation of public officials had occurred in the non-employment context. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 280 (1964). In Pickering, the Court refused to adopt this as a general standard to be considered by courts in every public-employee, freedom of speech
case. Pickering, 391 U.S. at 569.
38. See generally Board of Trustees v. Spiegel, 549 P.2d 1161, 1176 (Wyo. 1976).
The Wyoming Supreme Court considered whether the speech by a continuing contract
teacher was knowingly or recklessly false. The teacher's speech was critical of the
school administrator and was made outside the employment context. The court also
balanced the applicable competing interests. Id. at 1176-77. See also Atcherson v.
Siebenmann, 605 F.2d 1058, 1062-63 (8th Cir. 1979) (applying the balance).
39. 429 U.S. 274 (1977).
40. Id. at 282.
41. Id. at 284.
42. Id. at 281-82. Prior to the release of the memorandum, the teacher had been
involved in several incidents which may have influenced the school board's decision.
The teacher had previously been suspended for arguing with another instructor. He
also had used profanity with students, had made obscene gestures to female students,
and had argued with school-cafeteria employees. Id.
43. Id. at 287.
44. Id. The case was remanded to determine whether the board could have met its
burden of showing that it would not have renewed his contract even without the memorandum. Id.
45. Id. at 285-86.
46. Id. at 285.
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Adding a Public-Concern-ThresholdInquiry
In Connick v. Myers, the United States Supreme Court expanded
upon the circumstances which must be present to protect a public employee's freedom of speech right.4" In Connick, the dispute arose when
Myers, an assistant district attorney, learned of her impending transfer to a different department within the district attorney's office. Concerns about office policy surfaced when Myers spoke to her supervisor
about the transfer and, as a result, she circulated a questionnaire to
co-workers. There were fourteen questions on the questionnaire, thirteen of which dealt with office policies and procedures. The remaining
question asked whether co-workers felt "pressured to work in political
campaigns on behalf of office supported candidates."4 " After distributing the questionnaire, Myers was terminated."9
The Court in Connick added a public-concern-threshold inquiry
which should be considered prior to balancing the competing interests
of the employee and employer." ° The Court found that, initially, the
speech in question must involve a matter of public concern.' This
threshold inquiry was a question of law to be determined from the
"content, form, and context" of the speech.52 If the employee had spoken out of a purely personal motive, such as might occur if there was a
transfer, termination, or other employment-dispute, the speech would
lack the necessary public concern. However, even in an employment
dispute context, speech with an extremely important public-concern
content might be able to minimally meet the threshold. The Court in
Connick determined that since the speech had some important, politi-

47. Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138 (1983).
48. Id. at 140-41, app. at 155.
49. Id. at 141-42. The district court found that the questionnaire was protected
speech and that Myers had been wrongfully terminated because of it. The court of
appeals affirmed.
50. Id. at 147-49. In Pickering, the United States Supreme Court emphasized the
public's interest in having free and unhindered debate on matters of public concern,
but it did not specifically set up a threshold element. Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391
U.S. 563, 573 (1968).
51. Connick, 461 U.S. at 149-50. Speech which addresses a matter of public concern relates to any matter of political, social or other community concern. Id. at 146.
Public-concern issues, for example, are those which promote informed decision-making
by the electorate to bring about desired political and social changes, address racial
discrimination, or inform taxpayers about how tax revenue is raised and should be
spent. Id. at 145-46 (citing Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957); Givhan v.
Western Line Consolidated Sch. Dist., 439 U.S. 410 (1979); Pickering, 391 U.S. at 57172).
52. Connick, 461 U.S. at 147-48 & n.7
53. Id. at 148. The United States Supreme Court noted that because a transfer
was involved, the questionnaire arose from an employment dispute, and the thirteen
office policy questions were merely a means to gather ammunition against her employer. Her motive in circulating the questionnaire was suspect because she had circulated it after being informed of the transfer. If Myers had attempted to expose her
employer's improper actions, absent personal motivation, the questions concerning office policies would then have met the public-concern threshold. Id.
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cal content, the minimum public-concern threshold was met. 4
The Court in Connick then balanced the competing interests of
the employee and employer. 5 In addition to the Pickering factors,5 6
the Court added other factors which it considered important to this
balancing process. 7 One consideration was whether the speech arose
within an employment-dispute context. Personal motive was present
in Connick because this employee opposed the departmental transfer;
therefore, the Court gave less weight to the employee's interests in
speaking than to the employer's interests favoring the termination. 8
However, the Court indicated that an employment-dispute context
would not automatically weigh in the employer's favor and that the
court would consider other circumstances. 9 Under a "time, place, and
manner" factor, if the speech occurred on the employee's own time
and in non-work areas, the Court need not give more weight to the
employer's interests because there would be little work disruption."
In contrast, speech in violation of announced office policy could weigh
against 6the
employee because of the speech's "time, place, or
1
manner."
Another factor was the closeness of the working relationships
which would be disrupted by the speech. Because the Court in Connick found that close-working relationships were essential to the efficiency of this office, it gave greater weight to the employer's judgment
on how best to control internal office affairs. 2 The Court did not require the employer to show actual office disruption and destruction of
working relationships as a result of the speech. In this situation, the
employer's fear of disruption Was enough to tip the balance.6 3 Because
the balance had tipped in favor of the employer in Connick, the
speech was not constitutionally protected and therefore, the Court did
not need to address the Mount Healthy City elements of causation.
The employer was allowed to' use the'speech as a permissible reason
for the termination and no further inquiry was necessary. '

54. Id. at 149-51. The Court found that the question concerning political campaigns touched on a matter of public concern. See supra note 51. The Court determined that the content of the speech on this one question was extremely important,
even though it arose out of an employment dispute. However, it was given less weight
because of the Court's emphasis on the thirteen "ammunition" questions. See supra
note 53; Connick, 461 U.S. at 149, 152, 154.
55. Connick, 461 U.S. at 147-50, 153.
56. See supra text accompanying notes 34 and 35 (describing the Pickering
factors).
57. Connick, 461 U.S. at 150-53.
58. Id. at 154.
59. Id. at 152-53.
60. Id. at 153 n.13.
61. Id. at 153 & n.14. The employee in Connick had not violated established office
policy. Id.at 153. See also Mount Healthy City Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274,
284 (1977).
62. Connick, 461 U.S. at 151-52.
63. Id.
64. See supra text accompanying notes 39-46 (discussion of Mount Healthy City
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The United States Supreme Court followed Connick in Rankin v.
McPherson.6 5 In Rankin, the employee was a probationary clerical
worker in a constable's office." Upon hearing of the assassination attempt on President Reagan, the employee said, privately, to a coworker, "[11f they go for him again, I hope they get him." After the
remark was reported to the constable, the employee was fired."' Initially, the Court evaluated whether the speech touched on a matter of
public concern. 8 In Rankin, the Court found that the content of the
employee's speech, although inappropriate, did involve a matter of
public concern. 9
Because the speech arose in the context of a private conversation,
the Court in Rankin gave less weight to the employer's interests. 70
The employer's apprehension about future interference with its lawenforcement goals was inadequate to tip the balance.7 ' The Court considered the fact that this employee had no confidential, policy-making, or public-contact responsibilities; therefore, the employee's private conversation presented little danger to the constable's office. 72
Because the employer's only reason for this termination was the employee's constitutionally protected speech, the termination was reversed and the Court
did not address the Mount Healthy City ele73
ments of causation.
The Sequential, Four-Part Test
Based on the United States Supreme Court's analyses in these
cases, many state and federal courts have developed a sequential,
four-part test to assist the determination of whether a public employer has violated an employee's right to freedom of speech." First, a
court must decide whether an employee's speech touches on a matter
of public concern.75 Second, if the speech touches on a matter of pubcausation elements).
65. 483 U.S. 378 (1987).
66. Id. at 380.
67. Id. at 381-82.
68. Id. at 384-86.
69. Id. at 385-87. The United States Supreme Court agreed with the district court
that the speech did not amount to a punishable threat to kill the President. Id. (citing
18 U.S.C. § 871(a) and 18 U.S.C. § 2385).
70. Rankin, 483 U.S. at 388-89.
71. Id. at 389-90, 391 & n.17.
72. Id. at 390-92.
73. See supra text accompanying notes 42-44 (describing the causation elements
of "substantial factor" and "shifting the burden").
74. Schalk v. Gallemore, 906 F.2d 491, 494-95 (10th Cir. 1990) (calling this a
multi-tier test). See Wren v. Spurlock, 798 F.2d 1313, 1317 (10th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1085 (1987) (describing burdens of proof); Cox v. Dardanelle Pub. Sch.
Dist., 790 F.2d 668, 672-76 (8th Cir. 1986). For a more detailed discussion of the
United States Supreme Court cases which make up this sequential test, see Massaro,
supra note 24; Dennis H. Mibrath, The Free Speech Rights of Public Employees: Balancing With the Home Field Advantage, 20 IDAHo L. REV. 703 (1984).
75. Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 137, 146 (1983).
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lic concern, the court will then balance the interest of the employee in
making the statement against the employer's interest in minimal disruption of the workplace.78 Third, if the balance weighs in favor of the
employee, the court will protect the speech and reverse the termination, provided the employee proves that the protected speech was a
substantial factor in the employer's decision.7" Fourth, the burden
shifts to the employer to prove that there was another, permissible
the termination which was unrelated to the protected
reason 7 for
8
speech.
THE PRINCIPAL CASE

Mekss argued that both her anonymous letter and telephone call
to Sherman were constitutionally-protected free speech. Justice
Thomas, writing for the Wyoming Supreme Court majority, chose to
analyze each incident separately using the four-part test.7 9
Majority's Analysis of the Anonymous Letter
The majority initially considered whether the anonymous letter
addressed a matter of public concern. 0 Mekss argued that she was
acting as a whistleblower because "she was attempting to draw attention to 'improper operations' at the School." 8' The majority agreed
that because the management of the'School was a matter of public
concern, her interests should be given the increased weight of a
whistleblower under the balancing step.2 However, although "conclud[ing] that the anonymous letter should be afforded the highest
level of constitutional protection," the majority simply assumed that
Mekss had met part one of the sequential test, the public-concern
threshold and part two, balancing the competing interests.8
The majority then addressed parts three and four by considering
whether the letter was the cause of the termination. Under part three,
Mekss had the burden of proving that the anonymous letter was a
substantial factor in the termination. 4 Since Geisler had testified that
Mekss was terminated for circumventing established lines of authority
and for refusing to comply with disciplinary measures, the majority
could not infer that the letter was a substantial factor.8 According to
76. Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968).
77. Mount Healthy City Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 287 (1977).
78. Id.
79. Mekss v. Wyoming Girls' Sch., 813 P.2d 185, 194 (Wyo. 1991), cert. denied,
112 S. Ct. 872 (1992). Justices Thomas, Cardine, and Macy comprised the majority.
80. Id. at 194-95.
81. Id. at 195.
82. Id. at 194-95 (citing Foster v. Ripley, 645 F.2d 1142, 1149 (D.C. Cir. 1981);
Conaway v. Smith, 853 F.2d 789, 797 (10th Cir. 1988)).
83. Id. at 195.
84. Id.
85. Id.
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the majority, assuming arguendo that the letter was a substantial factor, the School would have met its burden under part four of the test.
The court determined that Mekss' insubordination was a separate,
permissible cause, unrelated to the constitutionally-protected letter.86
The majority in Mekss described insubordination at the School
by analogy to a police department. 7 The School, like a law-enforcement agency, required a high degree of discipline, harmony, and loyalty from employees to accomplish its mission. According to the majority, the School justifiably expected its employees to use appropriate
means and channels for grievances. An employee who chose not to
follow the reporting rules was insubordinate and could be punished. 8
Majority's Analysis of the Telephone Call
In considering the public-concern threshold, the majority held
that the telephone call to Sherman, unlike the anonymous letter, did
not reach whistleblower status because Mekss was not acting out of
pure public concern.8 9 Mekss argued that she was attempting to expose the inadequacy of the investigation; however, the majority found
that Mekss lacked sufficient personal knowledge to question its adequacy." According to the majority, since the investigators interviewed
each employee thoroughly, the results were reliable and Mekss must
have had a personal motive for making the call.91 Even though the call
did not reach whistleblower status, the majority assumed that the
public-concern threshold was met because of the telephone call's
content.2
Upon balancing the competing interests of the employee and em86. Id. at 195-96.
87. Id. (citing Warner v. Town of Ocean City, 567 A.2d 160 (Md. Ct. Spec. App.
1989)). In Warner, a police officer wrote an anonymous letter to the mayor and city
council alleging unethical and illegal activities by a newly-appointed police captain.
The court found, when considering the time, place, and manner of the speech, that the
officer had failed to follow the implemented grievance procedures. It was the use of an
anonymous letter, not the content, which violated the police department's regulations
and resulted in the officer's demotion. The officer's actions constituted insubordination
which undermined the important interests of discipline, harmony, and loyalty required
by a law enforcement agency. Insubordination, by itself, was a justifiable reason for
demoting the officer, separate from the First Amendment issue. Warner, 567 A.2d at
162, 166-68.
88. Mekss, 813 P.2d at 196.
89. Id. Whistleblower speech would automatically meet the public-concern threshold and would be given increased weight when the competing interests were balanced.
Id. at 194-95. See supra text accompanying notes 81-82.
90. Mekss, 813 P.2d at 196 (citing Hughes v. Whitmer, 714 F.2d 1407, 1423 (8th
Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1023 (1984)).
91. Id. at 198. Speech was not entitled to protection if the point was simply to air
grievances of a purely personal nature. Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 148 (1983).
92. Mekss, 813 P.2d at 198. If the content of an employee's speech focused on
disclosing public officials' wrongdoing, it was more likely to be considered a matter of
public concern. Koch v. City of Hutchinson, 847 F.2d 1436, 1445 (10th Cir. 1988)(en
banc), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 909 (1988).
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ployer under the second element of the sequential test, the majority
concluded that the scales tipped in the School's favor. 3 The majority
indicated that the education and rehabilitation goals of the School,
which involved teaching the residents to solve problems in a direct
94
and honest manner, could be undermined by Mekss' telephone call.
The majority, again by analysis to a police department, found that the
School had a strong interest in maintaining discipline and esprit de
corps through the chain-of-command rule." Mekss' violation of this
rule could undermine confidence and trust among co-workers.9 6 Even
though the call may not have affected Mekss' ability to perform her
own duties, it could have potentially interfered with School operations, subverted Geisler's authority, and destroyed close-working relationships. 7 Mekss' telephone call did not survive the balancing test
and therefore did not reach the level of protected speech.98 As a result, the majority did not proceed to analyze parts three and four of
the sequential test. The majority found that Mekss was justifiably terminated for violating the School's chain-of-command rule. 9
The Dissent's Analysis
A well-reasoned dissent, written by Justice Urbigkit and joined
by Justice Golden, approved the majority's adoption of the four-part
test but rejected the majority's analysis.' 0 Because the majority found
that Mekss was justifiably terminated for violating the chain-of-command rule by making the telephone call, the dissent focused its analysis on that incident. The dissent maintained that the telephone call
should have been protected speech and Mekss should not have been
terminated for it. According to the dissent,
[b]y demonstrating that it is again the messenger who is at risk,
this whistleblower case does not suit my sense of either justice or
justification to approve Mekss' termination from public employment ....
Public employees who speak out should now fear that
they will lose their jobs, forfeit salary increases, or be denied promotions. When faced with such consequences, self-imposed censorship is often the most prudent choice. This self-imposed cendi fr /93. Mekss, 813 P.2d at 199.
94. Id.
95. Id. (citing Crain v. Board of Police Comm'rs, 920 F.2d 1402 (8th Cir. 1990);
Hughes, 714 F.2d 1407).
96. Id.
97. Id. at 199-200. See generally Melton v. City of Oklahoma City, 879 F.2d 706
(10th Cir. 1989), on reh'g vacated and remanded on other grounds, 928 F.2d 920 (10th
Cir. 1991).
98. Mekss, 813 P.2d at 200. See, e.g., Huber v. Leis, 704 F. Supp. 131 (S.D. Ohio
1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1020 (1990) (speech did not survive the balance).
99. Mekss, 813 P.2d at 199-200. "The discipline administered to Mekss was not
directed 'at speech as such, but at employee behavior, including speech, which [was]
detrimental to the efficiency of the employing agency.' " Id. (quoting Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134, 162 (1974)).
100. Id. at 208 (Urbigkit, C.J., dissenting).
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sorship is of profound consequence not only to the millions who
work for the government, but also to the public who may have an
interest in hearing their unexpressed views.' ° '
When addressing the sequential, four-part test, the dissent's analysis paralleled the majority's. Initially, the dissent addressed the public-concern threshold. According to the dissent, however, the purpose
of the public-concern threshold was to exclude those cases arising out
of a purely personal dispute."0 ' The dissent argued that Mekss had
nothing personal to gain when she made the telephone call and, based
on the continuing distrust and poor morale at the School, she perceived that the investigation was inadequate.' 3 Mekss' statements
during the telephone call, if true, suggested that Geisler and the
Board had not been properly discharging their duties. Therefore, argued the dissent, the telephone call was clearly made out of public
concern and should have been granted whistleblower status.' 4 In this
context, termination based on criticism of the employer should be
lawful only if the employee had knowingly or recklessly made false
statements.'°5
In balancing the competing interests of the employee and employer, the second element of the sequential test, the dissent addressed the following applicable factors: (1) possible disruption in the
workplace, (2) the employee's responsibilities, and (3) the chain-of
command rule.'0 0 According to the dissent, minor disruptions and general disharmony in an office are always foreseeable consequences when
the improper activities of a supervisor are reported. If courts gave this
factor much weight, a whistleblower could always be terminated for
exposing a supervisor.' 7 The dissent also considered Mekss' job responsibilities. Because she had no confidential, policy-making, or public-contact role, there was minimal danger to the School's successful
and smooth function. '0 8 Addressing the chain-of-command rule, the
dissent concluded that if the rule were enforced against an employee
who criticized a supervisor, the employee's First Amendment freedom

101. Id. at 207.
102. Id at 209 (citing Berger v. Battaglia, 779 F.2d 992, 998 (4th Cir. 1985), cert.
denied, 476 U.S. 1159 (1986)).
103. Id.
104. " 'Speech that seeks to expose improper operation of the government or
questions the integrity of governmental officials clearly concerns vital public interests.'" Id. (quoting Conaway v. Smith, 853 F.2d 789, 797 (10th Cir. 1988)).
105. Id. (citing Board of Trustees v. Spiegel, 549 P.2d 1161, 1176 (Wyo. 1976)).
See supra notes 36-38 and accompanying text.
106. Mekss, 813 P.2d at 211-12 (Urbigkit, C.J., dissenting).
107. Id. at 211. "'It would be anomalous to hold that because the employee's
whistle blowing might jeopardize the harmony of the office or tarnish the integrity of
the department, the law will not allow him to speak out on his perception of potential
improprieties or department corruption.' " Id. (quoting Conaway, 853 F.2d at 797-98)
108. Id. at 211-12 (citing Rankin v. McPherson, 483 U.S. 378, 390-92 (1987)). See
supra text accompanying note 72.
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of speech would be impermissibly chilled.'0 9 Significantly, this rule
"would deter 'whistle blowing' by public employees on matters of public concern. It would deprive the public in general and its elected officials in particular of important information about the functioning of
government departments."'"' The dissent concluded that Mekss' interests outweighed those of the School in preventing possible disruption, and she therefore met her burden of proving the telephone call
was constitutionally protected speech."'
The dissent proceeded to analyze the facts under the causation
elements, "substantial factor" and "shifting the burden." The dissent
maintained that Mekss would have prevailed on the "substantial factor" element because the telephone call was the specific act constituting grounds for the termination." 2 Under the dissent's analysis,
Mekss proved the first three elements and therefore, "[tihe government's violent reaction to employee dissent [was] clearly not justified
in this case." ' "1 3 Upon shifting the burden, the School would have been
unable to prove that it had a separate, permissible reason for the termination because Geisler stated that he terminated Mekss for the
telephone call.
ANALYSIS

Mekss was erroneously decided. Because the majority did not
take Mekss seriously as a whistleblower, its analysis of both the anonymous letter and the telephone call was skewed. The majority gave
the School's interest in preventing possible disruption startling
weight. As a consequence, few Wyoming public employees will feel
safe in disclosing much-needed information about public institutions
because retaliation has now been legitimized.
The Anonymous Letter
The majority in Mekss did not ultimately base its decision on the
anonymous letter. However, because the majority's analysis of the letter set the stage for the decision, this casenote will address it. Even
though many of the same factors were applicable to both the letter
and the telephone call, the majority reached different results in each
instance. As a result, the majority's two analyses are difficult to
reconcile.
The majority initially emphasized that Mekss was a whistleblower
when she wrote the anonymous letter and therefore, the letter would
109.
732 F.2d
110.
111.
112.
113.

Mekss, 813 P.2d at 212 (Urbigkit, C.J., dissenting) (citing Brockell v. Norton,
664, 668 (8th Cir. 1984)).
Id. (quoting Czurlanis v. Albanese, 721 F.2d 98, 106 (3d Cir. 1983)).
Id. at 207.
Id. at 212-13.
Id. at 213.
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be granted the highest level of constitutional protection." 4 Based on
the United States Supreme Court's analysis in Pickering and the Wyoming Supreme Court's analysis in Board of Trustees v. Spiegel,
whistleblowing speech should be judged as if made by a member of
the public." 5 The anonymous letter would then be protected unless it
was knowingly or recklessly false and there had been actual, significant disruption at the School."" However, even though the majority
initially stated that Mekss was a whistleblower, it then cavalierly assumed that the letter had minimally met the public-concern threshold. As a result, the majority did not grant the letter the stated "highest level of constitutional protection" available." 7 The anonymous
letter was actually given very little weight which resulted in a skewed
analysis of the remaining elements.
Because the majority had not actually considered Mekss to be a
whistleblower under step one, it gave her interests little examination
or credibility under the second element. As a result, the majority
again merely assumed, without discussion, that Mekss' interests prevailed."' The majority did not examine Mekss' allegations closely and
treated this as a mere disciplinary matter better handled by the
School.
Under the causation elements of "substantial factor" and "shifting the burden,""' 9 the majority found that the letter was not a substantial factor in Mekss' termination.2" However, the majority did not
carefully examine the School's motive for the termination. Because
the letter had been given little public concern or weight, the majority
did not fully consider the disciplinary measures imposed. Mekss had
three extremely limited alternatives for discipline after she revealed
that she had authored the anonymous letter. In essence, she was required to apologize for writing the letter or lose her job. 2 ' If the majority had actually granted Mekss whistleblower status and the letter
First Amendment protection, as it should have, she would not have
been required to retract the allegations in the letter. Because the majority determined that the letter was not a substantial factor in the
termination, the burden did not shift to the School to show a separate, permissible reason unrelated to the speech.

114. Mekss v. Wyoming Girls' Sch., 813 P.2d 185, 194-95 (Wyo. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S.Ct. 872 (1992). See supra text accompanying notes 81-83.
115. Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 569 (1968); Board of Trustees v.
Spiegel, 549 P.2d 1161, 1176 (Wyo. 1976).
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.

See supra notes 36-38 and accompanying text.
Mekss, 813 P.2d at 194-95.
Id. at 195.
See supra text accompanying notes 42-44.
Mekss, 813 P.2d at 195.
Id. at 190. See supra text accompanying note 14.
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The Telephone Call
When it addressed the public-concern threshold, the majority erroneously dismissed Mekss' argument that she had been acting as a
whistleblower when she made the telephone call.' 2 2 The majority
should have granted Mekss whistleblower status because she was
again attempting to expose problems at the School and with the investigation.12 The majority should have granted protection to Mekss'
telephone call, provided the statements made were not knowingly or
Mekss' statements were not false because the
recklessly false.'
School had continuing problems after the investigation, therefore, it
those problems and to question the
was reasonable for her to report
125
adequacy of the investigation.
The majority gave the telephone call a minimum of public concern when it simply assumed that the public-concern threshold was
met. Because of a suspicion that Mekss had a personal motive when
she made the call, the majority gave it less public concern than it gave
to the anonymous letter. 26 According to the majority, since a typical
public citizen would not have questioned the results of the investigation, it could be inferred that Mekss' motivation was purely perin Mekss, there was absolutely no evidence of personal.' 27 However,
28
sonal motive.
Because the majority determined that the telephone call only
minimally addressed a matter of public concern, it gave less weight to
Mekss' interests. As a result, the School's expectation of employee discipline, harmony, and loyalty, promoted through the chain-of-command rule, prevailed. 2 9 The majority gave no weight to either the fact
that Mekss had been advised to take her concerns to Sherman or that
Sherman had assured Mekss' co-worker that there would be no retaliation.' 30 In general, an employee who reports problems with superiors
should not be required to follow the chain-of-command rule. This
would impermissibly chill First Amendment rights and deter
whistleblowing."' Because the majority did not grant Mekss
whistleblower status for the telephone call, it did not address any of

122. Mekss, 813 P.2d at 196.
123. Id. at 189-90.
124. See supra notes 36-38 and accompanying text.
125. Mekss, 813 P.2d at 189.
126. Id.
127. Id. at 197-98. See supra note 91 and accompanying text (majority's discussion of personal motive).
128. Some courts address the motivation or "point" of the speech. Is the employee
attempting to bring wrongdoing to light or further a purely private interest? See
Kemp v. State Bd. of Agric., 803 P.2d 498, 503 (Colo. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct.
2798 (1991). See also Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 139, 148 (1983).
129. Mekss, 813 P.2d at 195-96.
130. Id. at 192; Brief of Appellant, supra note 4, at 10. See supra note 9 and
accompanying text.
131. See supra text accompanying notes 109-10.
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the important public-policy issues which favor whistleblowing.
The majority also gave more weight to the School's claim that the
telephone call could undermine the School's goals.13 The School was
not required to show that actual disruption occurred, 33 and furthermore, since Mekss' telephone call occurred on her own time, there
would be minimal work disruption.' 34 Mekss had no confidential, policy-making, or public-contact responsibilities, and therefore, there was
little danger of disrupting the School's function.131 Minimal disruption
and disharmony are foreseeable consequences when an employee reports the improper activities of a supervisor. 3 ' Also, the School had
already been experiencing poor morale and disharmony for at least a
year prior to Mekss' telephone call.'3 7 Therefore, not all disruption
and disharmony can be attributed to her call.
Comparing Mekss to the United States Supreme Court Cases
The United States Supreme Court protects whistleblowers in
First Amendment cases. Pickering, from both the context and the
content of the speech, was a whistleblower case and not an employment-dispute case.' 38 Therefore, the Court did not give significant
weight to the employer's interest. In Connick, the Court gave meaningful weight to the employer's interest because the employee's speech
arose out of a personal-employment dispute and was not a
whistleblower case. 3" The Court looked at the reason for the speech,
which was to gather ammunition for the employment dispute, and determined that potential for office disruption outweighed the employee's interest. By contrast, the employee speech in Rankin arose
outside the employment-dispute context and therefore, the employer
was required to show actual disruption caused by the employee
speech.1 40 In the context of a private conversation, the Court gave
more protection to speech which only minimally touched on a matter
of public concern.
These cases show that, though significant, context of the speech
will not always determine the outcome. Outside the employment-dispute context, if the speech touches on a matter of public concern, the
Court will grant the employee's speech significant weight when per132. Mekss, 813 P.2d at 199.
133. Id.
134. Id. at 210-11 (Urbigkit, C.J., dissenting). See supra text accompanying note
60 (speech occurring on employee's own time would cause little disruption).
135. See supra text accompanying note 72.
136. See supra note 107 and accompanying text.
137. Mekss, 813 P.2d at 188.
138. Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 563 (1968). See supra notes 31-38 and
accompanying text (Pickering discussed in BACKGROUND section).
139. Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138 (1983). See supra text accompanying notes
47-63 (Connick discussed in BACKGROUND section).
140. Rankin v. McPherson, 483 U.S. 378 (1987). See supra text accompanying
notes 65-73 (Rankin discussed in BACKGROUND section).
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forming the balance. The employer will have to show substantial disruption in the workplace in order for the scales to tip in its favor.
Also, if the employee is exposing government mismanagement as a
whistleblower, the employer should be required to show the speech
was knowingly or recklessly false.
Mekss was a valued employee,' having no personal employment
dispute with her employer. Nevertheless, the Wyoming Supreme
Court inferred that Mekss had a personal motive against either Geisler or the School.' 4 2 Because of this unknown, hidden motive, the
court only required that the School show the telephone call had the
potential to interfere with the School's function. 4 3 The court gave excessive weight to the School's interests and erroneously upheld the
retaliatory termination.
The majority compared the School to a police department to
demonstrate how the important goals of discipline and esprit de corps
4
could be furthered by a chain-of-command rule.1 The law-enforcement cases cited by the majority each contained an employment dispute or obvious personal motive. ' To support its position, the majority also cited non-police department cases. These disputes also arose
because of some personal motive.' 6 No personal motive was present
in Mekss.
In Mekss, if the Wyoming Supreme Court had recognized the
whistleblowing context of the speech, its attention would have been
properly focused on the content of the speech. Because there is a high
degree of public concern over management of state institutions, focusing on the content in this case would have benefitted both the public
and the School. As explained by the dissent, repressing public-employee freedom of speech will only result in improper operation of
government institutions in the future because employees will be afraid
to speak out. 4 7 If the court curbs an employee's freedom of speech in
141. Mekss v. Wyoming Girls' Sch., 813 P.2d 185, 187-88 (Wyo. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 872 (1992).
142. Id. at 198.
143. Id. at 199.
144. id. at 195-96, 199.
145. Crain v. Board of Police Comm'rs, 920 F.2d 1402, 1405 (8th Cir. 1990) (officer
discharged for violating sick leave regulations); Hughes v. Whitmer, 714 F.2d 1407,
1411 (8th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1023 (1984) (inter-departmental transfer of
two officers because of personal conflicts between them); Huber v. Leis, 704 F. Supp.
131, 133 (S.D. Ohio 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1020 (1990) (written reprimand arose
out of a dispute involving the arrest of the employee's son); Perry v. City of Kinlock,
680 F. Supp. 1339, 1340-41 (E. D. Mo. 1988) (officer discharged because of a disputed
automobile accident report which arose during normal course of his employment);
Warner v. Town of Ocean City, 567 A.2d 160, 166 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1989) (officer
demoted because of speech which arose when he was passed over for promotion).
146. Hesse v. Board of Educ., 848 F.2d 748, 750 (7th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 489
U.S. 1015 (1989) (evidence of prior negative employee evaluations was present); Leiphart v. North Carolina Sch. of the Arts, 342 S.E. 2d 914, 917 (N.C. Ct. App. 1986)
(employee held a departmental meeting while dean was out of town).
147. Mekss, 813 P.2d at 207 (Urbigkit, C.J., dissenting).
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one government institution, it will effectively chill expression in all
institutions. Employees will understandably remain quiet to protect
their jobs.
CONCLUSION

The Wyoming Supreme Court in Mekss erroneously applied the
sequential, four-part test based upon the United States Supreme
Court cases in this area. The Wyoming Supreme Court erred when it
did not emphasize Mekss' whistleblower status under the public-concern-threshold element. As a result, the court did not give the letter
the highest protection possible under the First Amendment and did
not give the letter significant weight when it balanced Mekss' interests
in speaking out against those of the School in maintaining an efficient
and harmonious workplace. The letter was protected speech and
Mekss was impermissibly fired because of it.
Under the court's separate analysis of the telephone call, it erroneously refused to grant Mekss whistleblower status when she made
the call questioning the investigation. Mekss had no personal motive
in speaking and was merely attempting to expose improper governmental activities. Mekss' interests in speaking deserved maximum
protection under the First Amendment. The School, deferentially, was
not required to show actual, significant disruption in its operation as a
result of the telephone call or that the information relayed to Sherman was knowingly and recklessly false. Because the School listed the
call as a specific reason for its decision, Mekss met her burden in
proving that the telephone call was a substantial factor in her
termination.
After Mekss, public employees will not risk exposing the mismanagement of state institutions out of fear of employer retaliation. Because Wyoming courts have been slow to recognize whistleblower status and to protect freedom of speech in these situations, fewer
employees will come forward. Ultimately, it is the people of Wyoming
who suffer because of the loss of this informed, collective voice.
LAURIE H. JANACK
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